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Abstract 
While scholars have emphasized the importance of information for accountability, little research 
has addressed the demand for government information by real citizens. We study the totality of 
information requests filed with Mexican federal government agencies from 2003 to 2015, over 1 
million requests in all. We use unsupervised methods to categorize requests, revealing the 
diversity of topics including environment, security, budgets, and government procurement and 
employees. While many topics have clear public accountability-seeking purposes, others are 
focused on more private, micro-political goals. Analysis over time and across states reveals 
linkage between information demand and issues of public interest such as environmental impacts 
and criminal violence. Our results demonstrate that, given functioning access-to-information 
institutions, citizens in a transitional democracy really do demand information relevant to public 
accountability. 
 
 
  
	2	
Introduction 
Citizens around the world are more empowered to seek and access government information than 
ever. Over 100 countries have passed access-to-information (ATI) laws, enabling citizens to 
request documents and information and obligating officials to respond (Ackerman and Sandoval-
Ballesteros 2006, Roberts 2006, Florini 2007). National, provincial, and local governments 
around the world are also embracing new “open government” mechanisms, making government 
information available proactively through online platforms (Meijer et al. 2012, Fung 2013, 
Piotrowski 2016). Research on the supply of government information is advancing on multiple 
fronts, seeking both to understand why and how such policies and mechanisms come about, and 
what effects information has on citizen and politician behavior.  
However, little attention has been paid to the demand for information. Most research to 
date has relied on implicit assumptions about what information citizens actually want. Research 
and advocacy on ATI and open data policies are motivated by the assumption that they function 
as a tool of public accountability – but are these policies being used that way in practice? And 
experimental research that exposes citizens in developing countries to informational treatments 
generally fails to ask what politically relevant information those citizens might actually want, 
and actually seek on their own in a real-world context. We thus focus on main two questions: 
What information do citizens seek? And how does information demand link to issues of public 
importance?  
When provided with a mechanism to request government information, do citizens ask for 
documents or data that they can use to hold policymakers publicly accountable – that is, to 
evaluate government performance, investigate potential wrongdoing, or mobilize for political 
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goals? More broadly, can the information sought by citizens contribute to “action cycles” (Fung 
et al. 2007; Kosack and Fung 2014) that help engender public accountability?  
Past approaches suggest two different models, differing in the extent to which citizens
1
 
predominantly seek information with public or private goals. Under a public accountability 
model of information demand, citizens seek information that is suitable to uses in political 
mobilization and oversight, and is linked with issues of importance or interest to the population 
at large. Such a model is also consistent with traditional principal-agent approaches to electoral 
politics. Activists, journalists, and electoral campaigns have much to gain by obtaining evidence 
of government performance and decisionmaking, particularly in low- and middle-income 
democracies where corruption and inefficiency are widespread (Rothstein 2011), and many case 
studies offer success stories of information use in campaigns to demand better public services or 
denounce corruption (e.g. Jenkins and Goetz 1999, Cejudo 2012, Gaventa and McGee 2013, van 
Zyl 2014). These cases present the tantalizing possibility that the demand for public 
accountability-generating information is the rule rather than the exception, and that the main 
obstacle in most contexts is not demand but supply: the availability of functioning ATI 
institutions.  
However, many skeptics see publicly-relevant information as only the “tip of the 
iceberg,” with more mundane information comprising the submerged majority (Michener and 
Worthy 2015). Under such an “iceberg” model, citizens predominantly seek information for 
private, micro-political goals with little potential for publicity or demand-making on behalf of 
																																																								
1
 By “citizens” we mean the entire public; including ordinary individuals as well as organizations, journalists, and 
commercial entities that may be acting either on their own account or as intermediaries in disseminating information 
to the broader public. 
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collective goals, and unlinked from issues of public attention. Examples include information 
useful in solving private problems, either in the business sector (e.g., navigating regulations, 
pursuing government contracts) or for individuals (e.g. accessing government benefits, 
completing official procedures, acquiring data for research). While these uses are important, they 
resemble the sorts of information most often available on government websites (Thomas and 
Streib 2003, Almazan and Gil-García 2008), and may not justify costly investments in ATI 
institutions. Some critics, often politicians themselves, even argue that ATI institutions are being 
abused through such private uses, constituting a waste of government resources (Kwoka 2016, 
Worthy 2017). 
Further cause for skepticism derives from recent experimental studies that have found 
only mixed or inconclusive results as to whether exposure to new information can change voter 
behavior or spark greater accountability (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2012, Lieberman et al. 
2014, Chong et al 2015). These studies raise the possibility that the supply of information is not 
the core obstacle to holding politicians accountable, but rather deficits in human capital and 
collective action capacity are to blame. Such deficiencies may affect not only what people do 
with information, but also their demand for accountability-relevant information in the first place. 
Further, classic studies linking socioeconomic status to political participation (Verba et al. 1978; 
Verba et al. 1995) suggest that demand for publicly relevant information would be more anemic 
in new democracies, where a greater share of citizens are poor and inexperienced in democratic 
politics.  
By studying the demand for information by real citizens, we evaluate the validity of these 
two models. We find evidence that both public, macro-political and private, micro-political uses 
are frequent and persistent over time. However, we find that the majority of topics of information 
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demand have clear potential for public accountability-oriented uses, and that demand for 
information is linked to issues of public importance both over space and over time. These 
findings support the public accountability model of information demand, amended with a 
recognition of the complex layering of multiple information uses, both public and private, even 
on the same platform and from the same government agencies.  
We assess citizen demand for information in the context of Mexico, using data on every 
information request filed with federal government agencies from 2003 to 2015 – over 1 million 
in all. Mexico’s Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública 
Gubernamental (Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information) was signed 
into law by President Vicente Fox on June 10, 2002. This law has been called “one of the 
world’s most innovative and best funded, operational and responsive” (Michener 2015), and “an 
unprecedented opportunity to address the rising public demand for a government committed to 
transparency, accountability, and respect for a citizen’s right to know” (Sobel et al. 2006, 6). 
We take an inductive approach to characterizing Mexico’s ATI environment, using 
unsupervised topic modeling to categorize all 1 million-plus requests into twenty topics, based 
on the text of the requests themselves. These include many topics of clear public relevance, 
including the military, police, and crime; the oil and energy sectors; budgets and spending; the 
environment and land use; qualifications of government employees; and compliance information 
about public procurement. Other topics, however, appear more suited to private or micro-
political uses, such as seeking access to government benefits, services, or contracts. We 
characterize these topics and provide additional detail on each in an Online Appendix.  
We also demonstrate a strong linkage between demand for information and issues of 
public salience that vary across space – such as oil production – and over time – such as the 
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prevalence of criminal violence. These findings suggest that demand for government information 
is indeed embedded in processes of public accountability. Given the opportunity to use 
transparency mechanisms with relatively low barriers and relatively high performance, citizens 
in Mexico really do demand a diverse variety of information relevant to public accountability.  
The case of Mexico is of both theoretical and practical importance. While Mexico 
underwent a democratic transition in 2000, corruption and patronage remain commonplace, 
making it a frequent focus of studies on information and political accountability (Berliner and 
Erlich 2015, Chong et al. 2015, Fox 2007, Larreguy et al. 2016).  A pioneer among transitional 
democracies in the sophistication of its ATI institutions, we take Mexico as a test case to address 
whether citizens in such contexts actually seek accountability-producing information when 
provided with the opportunity. In practical terms, Mexico’s ATI law offers the opportunity to 
study the usage of a transparency mechanism in totality, over an extended period of time. In 
creating an online information system as the default means of filing requests, Mexico was unique 
among countries until recently. We build on the public availability of these data, including both 
request texts and metadata such as date, target agency, and locality. 
Importantly, our focus is limited to observed information requests. Our analysis is not of 
information demand by average citizens, or a representative sample of all citizens, but rather of 
the demand for information by those who sought government information. Like studies of many 
forms of political engagement – such as protest and campaign contributions – we observe only 
those who actually engage. Our analysis is thus not representative of what information all 
citizens would seek, were they to request. However, our focus on “revealed” demand is not only 
representative, but in fact exhaustive, of the information sought by citizens whose desire for 
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information outweighs the transaction costs of making requests. Thus, our approach is conducive 
to inferring the real-world uses of government information for public or private purposes.  
 
The Supply and Demand for Government Information 
ATI institutions are tools for vertical accountability (Mainwaring and Welna 2003, O’Donnell 
1998), designed to make politicians “answerable” (Schedler 1999) to citizens. Their premise is 
that when citizens have access to information about government performance and decision-
making, their political participation – both at the ballot box and through coordinated mobilization 
or lobbying – becomes more effective. There is thus a substantial focus on studying the supply of 
information – both in explaining the adoption and implementation of transparency institutions 
(Alt et al. 2006, Berliner 2014, Wehner and De Renzio 2013, Schnell 2017, Lagunes and 
Pocasangre 2017, Wood and Lewis 2017) as well as the effects of information on political 
institutions and outcomes (Besley and Burgess 2001, Alt and Lassen 2006, Snyder and 
Strömberg 2010, Worthy et al. 2017). 
More recently, a substantial literature has sought to test the effects of information supply 
using experimental approaches. Researchers deliver informational treatments to citizens, gauging 
their effect on public goods and service provision (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010, Reinikka and 
Svensson 2011, Lieberman et al. 2014), corruption (Olken 2007), or voting behavior (Chong et 
al. 2015, Humphreys and Weinstein 2012). Findings from many of these studies have been 
mixed or inconclusive. Some propose conditions that mediate the effect of information, such as 
individuals’ political attitudes and skills (Lieberman et al. 2014) or communities’ collective-
action capacity (Fox 2015).  
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But these studies fail to address an even more fundamental threat to informational 
theories of accountability: Do citizens really seek information about government performance in 
their political activities? Most applications of the principal-agent model to political 
accountability (Ferejohn 1986, Przeworski et al. 1999, Besley and Burgess 2001) implicitly 
require not just that citizens respond to information when supplied, but also that they demand 
information necessary to evaluate government performance. Yet this piece of the puzzle has 
received little explicit scholarly attention, perhaps because it is less amenable to conventional 
causal hypothesis testing. Better understanding of how information operates as a tool of 
accountability requires answering descriptive questions on the nature of demand, in addition to 
testing causal arguments about the effects of supply.  
To this end, our study places the focus on citizens, interrogating the demand-side of ATI. 
We ask: when given the opportunity to request government information, what type of 
information do citizens actually ask for? Citizen demand for information is pivotal in ATI 
systems such as Mexico’s where information comes in response to citizen requests to 
government agencies. Indeed Fung (2013) describes such systems as “information on demand.”
2
  
																																																								
2
 This ATI model contrasts with “targeted transparency,” where government agencies (or private actors) 
are compelled through mandatory disclosure to produce “standardized, comparable, and disaggregated 
information...to further a defined social purpose” (Fung, et al. 2007: 6). A third paradigm of transparency, 
which has received increasing attention, is “open government,” wherein governments proactively provide 
datasets that citizen groups analyze, often using sophisticated computational methods. While these two 
paradigms certainly have characteristics that are preferable to the information-on-demand model, our 
focus on the latter allows us to address the most prevalent mode of information delivery. As a practical 
	9	
We analyze citizen behavior in the context of a well-functioning ATI system,
3
 assessing 
the extent to which citizens request the type of information that is potentially useful in generating 
public accountability. We focus on what Joshi and Houtzager (2012: 151) refer to as social 
accountability: “ensuring the implementation of existing state obligations.” This definition 
stresses the oversight role of citizens and civil society in 1) evaluating government performance, 
particularly as it relates to the provision of services and public goods; and 2) detecting and 
exposing corruption. We consider a certain unit of information (a document, dataset, or datum) 
as relevant to public accountability if it is potentially useful in media coverage, political 
campaigns, the activation of horizontal accountability institutions (e.g. judiciary or anti-
corruption), or in public participation oriented towards demanding that politicians make policy 
changes or answer for their actions. This aligns with Michener and Worthy’s (2015: 10) 
distinction between public information – “pertinent to a broad, general audience” – and private 
uses “whose primary objective is self-regarding interest of an individual or particular group.”
4
  
																																																								
matter, by analyzing a request-based ATI system, we are availed with systematic data about the 
information that citizens request. 
3
 While far from perfect, Mexico’s ATI system is high performing relative to most in both developing and 
developed countries (Michener 2015). On average roughly 100,000 requests have been filed annually in 
recent years, and a majority receive on-time and positive responses. Although as Fox et al. (2011) reveal, 
a substantial portion of responses labeled as positive do not satisfactorily provide the information 
requested.  
4
 Michener and Worthy (2015) also distinguish between political and non-political types of information, 
but conclude that even nominally non-political uses tend to still have political implications, so we focus 
on their public-private distinction.  
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Existing research on information demand offers two contrasting expectations, which we 
group into an optimistic “public accountability model” and a more pessimistic “iceberg model.”  
On the one hand, scholars of ATI both around the world (Banisar 2006, Florini 2007) and 
in Mexico (Hevia 2012, Isunza Vera 2006, López Ayllón 2006) are quite optimistic about the 
theoretical potential of information to spur civic engagement and government accountability. 
Empirical studies of information demand in Mexico often analyze success cases, confirming 
these theorized benefits (Cejudo 2012, Fox et al. 2007, van Zyl 2014).
5
 Assessments in India 
suggest that many citizens seek information “with the aim of redressing grievances about the 
failure to deliver public services or complete public works,” with some examples of uses by 
advocacy groups and anti-corruption campaigns (Roberts 2010). Distelhorst (2017) demonstrates 
that, even in a non-democratic context with weak ATI institutions, activists in China are able to 
use information requests as a tool for political mobilization. For these scholars, information fills 
in a missing link, adding content to the demands of activists eager and willing to deploy it to 
pressure the state. 
Other studies – though also not based on systematic or representative data – have been 
considerably less sanguine about the accountability-enhancing effects of information. Scholars 
have suggested that while politically relevant requests receive the most attention among media 
and activists, these may be the “tip of the iceberg,” whereas the “submerged” mass of requests 
																																																								
5
 Other research in Mexico seeks to evaluate and score the quality of laws and formal institutions that 
constitute the ATI infrastructure, both nationally and subnationally (IFAI 2012, López Ayllón et al. 2013, 
Peschard, et al 2013, Trinidad Zaldívar 2006). Further studies evaluate government responsiveness, either 
by scoring the quality of government responses to actual information requests (Doyle 2008, Fox et al. 
2011) or using a “simulated user” approach (Cejudo et al. 2017, Lagunes and Pocasangre 2017).  
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are mundane, apolitical, or private (Michener and Worthy 2015). Studies in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh found requests “primarily to address personal grievances” or “personal matters such 
as bank loans and school examination results” (Asia Foundation 2014, p. 20-21), while a study in 
Albania reported “almost 90 percent of the requests are for basic information like access to drugs 
or medicine, procedures to get diploma accreditation, and deadlines for application for the 
universities” (Dokeniya 2013, p. 56).
6
  
These more sobering findings lend credence to depictions from the electoral behavior 
literature of citizens as information misers (Kitschelt 2000, Lupia 1994, Redlawsk 2004). More 
critical views, such as Fenster (2015, 161), even suggest that the public may be “uninterested, 
distracted, or incapable or unwilling to consider the revealed state.” Perhaps detailed information 
about government performance is simply not an important tool in electoral campaigns or 
activism, and citizens base their engagement on personal experience, news coverage, and elite 
cues. Alternatively, information may be useful, yet actual demand is restrained by limited human 
capital or financial resources – variables shown to shape civic engagement more broadly (Verba 
et al. 1995) – such that only elite and particularistic interests actually seek government 
information. Such limitations may be particularly relevant in lower-income and new 
democracies, such as Mexico – the very countries that suffer the most from poor governance. 
																																																								
6
 Doubts about ATI’s potential for accountability outside the developing world have also been raised. A 
frequent criticism of the United States Freedom of Information Act is its preponderant use by commercial 
entities for private purposes (Piotrowski 2008; Kwoka 2016), while in the United Kingdom, Worthy and 
Hazell (2016) note that requests by members of the public (as opposed to journalists, businesses, or 
researchers) “generally involve matters of private interest rather than wider political issues, focusing on 
specialized local or personal issues – waste, street fixing, tax and permits.”  
	12	
In order to evaluate these two models, we analyze several traits of actual citizen demand 
for information in Mexico. Do citizens primarily seek information useful in holding politicians 
accountable to their policy promises and good governance; or for their own private goals? Is the 
ATI system broadly used across policy areas or is it rather an enclave for a few topics or 
agencies? Is demand sensitive to changing features of public interest over space and time? This 
is the first independent study, to our knowledge, that conducts a systematic analysis of all citizen 
requests in a given context.
7
 As scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of “user-
centered” information environments (Fung et al. 2007, Jaeger and Bertot 2010), it is essential to 
understand how citizens actually use ATI institutions.  
 
Data and Methods 
Sample and Preprocessing 
Our project examines citizen demand for information by using unsupervised text analysis to 
categorize information requests by Mexican citizens. This method allows us to characterize the 
content of a large number of requests, moving beyond anecdotal depictions from high-profile 
cases. We complement the topic modeling approach with our own qualitative interpretations of 
the information categories in which we infer the accountability-generating potential of topics. 
Specifically, we analyze all ATI requests made to the federal Mexican government 
during the 2003-2015 period. Beginning with the launch of Mexico’s electronic request system 
																																																								
7
 Mexico’s information commission has conducted smaller-scale analysis of citizen requests (see: 
http://inicio.inai.org.mx/SitePages/Transparencia-Proactiva-acciones.aspx), hand-coding roughly 100-300 
requests for each of several government agencies, and developing an emergent coding scheme for the 
types of information sought, such as statistics, contracts, procedures, and documents. 
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in June of 2003, every federal ATI request has been made publicly available in CSV format on 
the government’s INFOMEX website, along with a range of associated metadata (INAI 2015). 
We downloaded each of these files for the 06/2003-08/2015 period,
8
 which contain the texts of 
each request, links to any associated attachments, and other relevant metadata including target 
agency, date, requester municipality, and date and nature of official response. However, these 
data include no information on the actual users, their identities or demographics, or which 
requests were filed by the same user. The annual number of public information requests, among 
full years of the data, ranged from 34,702 in 2004 to a peak of 116,615 in 2014.
9
 This increase in 
request volume itself suggests that citizens see value in the institution. 
Here we briefly describe how the request texts were formatted into a set of documents for 
topic modeling analysis. We provide a more extensive discussion of the preprocessing steps in 
the Online Appendix. The texts are citizens’ own open-ended descriptions of the information 
requested, as entered into the INFOMEX system, for all public information requests.
10
 While the 
																																																								
8
 At the time of analysis, the latest publicly available requests corresponded to 8/31/2015. 
9	This is equivalent to just under one request per 1,000 population in recent years. Comparisons by Holsen 
and Pasquier (2012) and Michener (2015), although including both information requests and personal data 
requests, suggest requests per population in 2010 were higher in Mexico than in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and India; but lower than in some Latin American countries with smaller populations such as 
Chile, El Salvador, and Peru. 	
10
 In addition to public information requests, the INFOMEX system also allows citizens to request 
personal data or corrections to personal data, such as employment records or social security entitlements. 
We do not include such personal data requests in this analysis, as they are governed by a different legal 
regime, and have their texts redacted from publicly available data for privacy reasons. 
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majority of requesters entered requests in a primary text field, a subset either left this field blank, 
or in 128,695 cases (just over 10% of the total) included a portion, or their entire request, as an 
attached file. We webscraped these attachments and converted each to machine-readable text.
11
 
Finally, we merged these converted files, along with an optional secondary text field, into our 
primary request text field. As a small number of requests were extremely long, often where an 
attached file contained an example report or a large spreadsheet, we truncated any request over 
1,000 character strings. This affected only 0.02% of our final documents. 
For all remaining request texts, we applied a set of common natural language processing 
techniques to convert our final corpus into a collection of individual “documents” compatible 
with the unsupervised topic modeling techniques used below, and to correct common typos, 
remove stopwords, and remove the most infrequently used words. These preprocessing steps are 
described in detail in the Online Appendix, and are generally consistent with similar pre-
processing efforts applied to political texts (Roberts et al. 2014; Bagozzi 2015; Bagozzi and 
Berliner 2016). These tasks yielded a corpus with 1,023,267 processed request documents and 
6,696 unique words.  
 
Modeling Approach 
We characterize the content of ATI requests using an unsupervised topic modeling approach 
known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA; Blei et al. 2003).
12
 LDA is a probabilistic topic 
model that uncovers latent dimensions of texts. These latent dimensions, or “topics,” are 
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 A very small number (< 0.1% of all attachments) were corrupted or missing, so not converted. 
12
 We describe this method in greater detail in our Online Appendix, alongside our rationale for choosing 
LDA over other plausible topic models.   
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assumed to have a representative set of words, and each document is then assumed to contain 
multiple overlapping topics. LDA then discovers these topics via a three-level hierarchical 
Bayesian model that treats documents as finite mixtures of underlying topics, and topics as 
infinite mixtures over a corresponding latent set of topic probabilities (Blei et al. 2003, 993). In 
this manner, each topic can be characterized by the set of words that LDA estimates as having 
the highest probability of association with that topic.  
As with most topic models, the researcher must choose the number of topics, !, to be 
estimated within LDA. We agree with others (e.g., Roberts et al. 2014) that there is no “right” 
choice for !, and that this decision should primarily rest on substantive expertise and the 
granularity of interest. Nevertheless, measures of topical density have proven useful for topic 
number selection in past LDA-research, and we apply these diagnostic tools in full in the Online 
Appendix. Stated briefly, we find that an optimal number of topics for our corpus lies in the ! =
[20, 50] interval. To guard against overfitting, we follow extant applications (e.g., Barberá et al. 
2014, Bagozzi 2015), as well as the one standard error rule (Hastie et al. 2009), to determine that 
!	 = 	20 is optimal for our application.  
We also estimate LDA models across a range of different topic numbers, and 
qualitatively evaluate their output. This comparison is presented in the Online Appendix, and 
again strongly suggests that our corpus can be most intuitively represented by a 20-topic model. 
Thus, both our model fit analysis and qualitative assessments provide support for the choice of a 
20-topic LDA model for our primary analysis, to which we now turn. 
 
Topics 
	16	
We estimate our primary 20 topic LDA model on our full corpus of 1,023,267 preprocessed 
documents via Gibbs sampling.
13
 This model identifies the 20 topics that best characterize the 
request texts across the 2003-2015 period. Each topic represents an underlying word distribution 
where every word in the corpus is given a probability of assignment to that topic. For these word 
vectors, we first derive the 10 “topwords” assigned the highest probability of association with 
each topic based on posterior word distributions. We next derive the 10 topwords that are both 
most highly associated with a given topic and most exclusive (“FREX”) in their assignment to a 
given topic, according to frequency exclusivity scoring metrics (Roberts et al. 2014). These word 
assignments inform our substantive interpretations of each topic.  
We also classified each document according to its single most associated topic. Using the 
probability estimates of each document’s association with each topic, we identified the topic with 
the highest probability of association for each document, and classified documents accordingly. 
This approach has precedent in text analysis literatures (Blei et al. 2003:1014, Bagozzi 2015, 
Wilkerson and Casas 2017; Hagemann et al. 2017), and summary statistics reported in the Online 
Appendix indicate that the typical request exhibits one topic with a “dominant” probability of 
assignment. 
We discuss our procedure for interpreting and labeling each topic in the next section. We 
report these labels, along with each topic’s topwords, in Figures 1 and 2 below. Note that our 
original topword vectors contained stemmed Spanish words. In order to present the topwords in a 
more interpretable manner, we identify the most common unstemmed version of each (stemmed) 
topword within the original corpus, and then translate each of these unstemmed topwords to 
English. We present these English-translated versions of each topic’s 10 topwords – alongside 
																																																								
13
 See the Online Appendix for further discussion of modeling choices. 
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our final topic labels – in Figure 2. We present the equivalent for the most frequent and exclusive 
words in Figure 3. We also present original Spanish-language versions in the Online Appendix. 
Additionally, we show the variation over time in the prevalence of each topic. The plots 
in Figure 3 show the trend over time for each selected topic (in black), and all other topics (in 
grey – for scale), as a proportion of all requesting activity. Thus, if requests in a given topic 
remain relatively flat over time as a proportion of all requests, that still reflects a growing 
absolute number of requests, as total request volume rises over time.   
	18	
 
 
Figure 1: Ten highest probability words representing each topic. Based on the original Spanish-
language word-stems, these are first unstemmed then translated into English. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Ten most “frequent and exclusive” words representing each topic (Roberts et al. 2014). 
Based on the original Spanish-language word-stems, these are first unstemmed then translated 
into English. 
 
Top 10 WordsTopic Labels
mexican; request for bids; josé; general; director; neighborhood; borough; copy; neighborhood; luis
credit; fiscal; payment; administration; federal; date; public; bank; tax; treasury
municipality; located; zone; project; water; request; buildings; san; environmental; federal
work; request; year; personal; wage; social; security; salary; payment; base
public; administration; name; addresses; general; area; employees; organization; officials; job
to know; information; can; thank you; to do; case; services; some; existence; should
each; month; code; existing; inventory; box; health; basic; entered; final
request; copy; documents; date; information; request/application; number; purpose; register; certified
program; project; development; national; support; social; carry out; resources; which; actions
request; approved; assembly; insertions; information; public; mexican; acts; corruption; following
i request; documents; borough; imss; delivery; provider; code; request for bids; institute; goods
pemex; mexican; services; year; business; operation; type; electronic; transportation; production
medication; year; number; hospital; i request; health; special; age; information; national
law; public; federal; information; article; access; transparent; unit; governmental; in accordance
education; studies; school; level; higher education; university; course; academic; technology; national
how much; year; number; i request; information; personal; which; federal; date; case
how much; year; budget; expenses; amount; each; destination; i request; information; part
contract; services; firm; amount; i request; name; dependents/employees; request for bis; date; security
request for bids; services; contract; technical personnel; public; decision; aquisitions; proposal; procedure; statement
purchase; please; number; information; medication; price; descriptions; amount of money; current; products
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Employees 3: Personnel
Taxes and Finance
Environment and Land
Employees 1: Salaries/Benefits
Employees 2: Functions/Qualif.
Individual Needs
Medical 3: Inventories
Commercial Information
Distributive Programs
Procurement 3: Anti−Corruption
Medical 1: Contracts/Suppliers
Energy and Utilities
Health Statistics
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roof; different; proposal; decision; proposal; statement; opening; leds; glossary; aquisitions
medication; purchase; to carry out; differentiating; price; restricted; storage; address; paragraph; sold
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Topics of Information Demand 
Our topic modeling approach was quite successful at identifying distinct and internally coherent 
topics of information request, and our analysis of these topics offers evidence that Mexico’s ATI 
system serves as a platform for citizens to access a wide variety of government information. We 
first discuss the inductive process by which we labeled each topic and evaluated its relevance to 
public accountability. We then offer greater detail on five topics – Environment and Land; 
Individual Needs; Budgets and Spending; Commercial Information; and Military, Police, and 
Crime – reflecting the diversity of both public and private information demands. (The Online 
Appendix provides extensive discussion of all twenty topics and our method for labeling each.)  
Our substantive interpretations of each topic are based on close readings of 1,600 total 
requests (corresponding to 80 sampled information requests from each topic), lists of each 
topic’s 20 topwords and “FREX” topwords, the distribution of requests across agencies, and the 
distribution of requests across states. To interpret each topic and assess likely requesters and 
potential action cycles, we triangulate across these multiple sources of information, as well as 
interviews conducted in several government ministries, media coverage of ATI requests, and our 
substantive familiarity with politics, civil society, and ATI in Mexico.  While we do not know 
definitive attributes of each requester, we highlight the types of requesters most likely to make 
use of each topic of information. Table 1 shows our qualitative coding for the potential of each 
topic to generate accountability as well as several other key characteristics. 
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Topic	
No.	
Topic Label 
 
% of 
Requests 
 
Common Request Types 
 
Potential Requesters/Action Cycles 
 
Potential for 
Accountability 
3 Land and the Environment  
 
8.64 
Environmental impact 
reports; construction permits; 
land titles; infrastructure 
plans 
-Citizen groups: protest or legal mobilization for environmental 
protection 
-Journalists: investigating corruption and improper procedures 
-Landowners and developers: title and permit procedures, 
commercial information 
high 
6 Individual Needs 
 
8.5 
Information about accessing 
gov. programs and benefits; 
bureaucratic procedures 
-Citizens: researching how to access social benefits; guidance 
for bureaucratic processes 
low 
17 Budgets and Spending 
 
7.98 
Aggregate budget figures; 
specific budget items or 
expense reports 
-Journalists: reporting on use of public funds 
-Citizen groups: activism or lobbying to influence spending, 
denounce corruption 
-Researchers: obtaining data 
high 
8 Commercial Information 
 
7.86 
Intellectual property records, 
business licenses, health and 
safety inspection results 
-Firms: follow-up on regulatory processes; investigating 
competitors; market research 
-Watchdogs: researching chemical/medical product approvals 
low/medium 
9 Distributive Programs 
 
7.06 
Lists of beneficiaries, rules of 
operation 
-Citizens: researching how to access gov. benefits 
-Journalists/activists: investigating bias or patronage 
high/medium 
16 Military, Police, and Crime 6.84 
Crime and criminal justice 
statistics, security policies, 
specific incidents 
-Journalists reporting on crime, violence, and security 
-NGOs advocating for human rights and security policy 
-Citizens: seeking information on violent events 
-Researchers: obtaining data 
high/medium 
4 Government Employees 1: 
Salaries and Benefits 
 
6.71 
Wages and benefits of 
government employees 
-Gov. employees (current and retired): seeking info. about 
benefits, HR policy 
-Citizens: seeking gov. employment 
low 
5 Government Employees 2: 
Functions and 
Qualifications 
 
6.26 
Government employees 
resumes, disciplinary records, 
organizational charts 
-Citizens: seeking to contact gov. official; finding out who does 
what; seeking gov. employment 
-Journalists: investigating patronage hiring 
-Gov. employees: info. about officials’ qualifications  
medium 
12 Energy and Public Utilities 5.65 
Statistics on 
prices/investment/spending 
of state oil company; prices 
and infrastructure for utilities 
-Investors/contractors: seeking industry info. to guide proposals 
or investment 
-Journalists: investigating performance or corruption in PEMEX 
and public utilities 
-Academics/NGOs: eval. energy policy or service delivery 
high/medium 
	21	
14 Internal Procedures and 
Official Documents 
5.19 
Internal agency procedures; 
specific document codes; 
legislation and regulations 
-Firms: info. for public bids, regulatory processes 
-Journalists: Seeking specific documents by reference number 
-Gov. employees: seeking info. about hiring or HR practices 
-Citizens or firms: seeking to identify relevant laws/regulations  
low/medium 
13 Medical Statistics  4.67 
Aggregate statistics on 
medical conditions and 
treatments 
-Journalists: reporting on health statistics and medical services 
-Academics/NGOs/Medical professionals: researching public 
health and medical services 
low 
1 Government Employees 3: 
Specific Personnel 
4.1 
Internal HR records, asset 
declarations, CVs 
-Journalists: reporting on gov. hiring practices, investigating 
corruption or wrongdoing 
-Citizens: seeking gov. employment  
high 
18 Public Procurement 1: 
Service Providers 
4.09 
Requests for bids (RFBs) or 
contracts for consultants and 
external contractors 
-Firms: seeking info. for gov. bids or following up on previous 
bids 
-Journalists/NGOs: oversight of contracting practices 
medium 
2 Banking, Finance, and 
Taxes 
3.83 
Records from financial crime 
investigations; banking 
oversight reports; tax data 
-Journalists/NGOs: reporting on financial policy or scandals 
-Citizens: appeals for consumer financial protection 
high 
15 Education 3.66 
School information and 
performance, statistics and 
names of teachers hired, 
budgets for teachers’ schools, 
teachers’ union 
-Journalists: reporting on education policy, hiring practices, 
teachers’ union 
-Academics/NGOs: researching education policy 
-Citizens: seeking employment; school information for children 
high/medium 
11 Medical Supplies 1: 
Contracts and Suppliers 
2.82 
Bids for medical supplies 
provisioning, often with a 
specific firm or RFB code 
-NGOs/citizen groups: investigating corruption, fraud, or under-
provision of medical services 
-Firms: seeking info. for gov. bids or on previous bids 
high 
19 Public Procurement 2: 
Procedures and Documents 
2.32 
Specific procurement 
documents: compliance 
reports RFBs, procedures, 
technical proposals, contracts 
-NGOs/citizen groups: researching procurement processes to 
detect corruption 
-Firms: seeking info. for gov. bids or following up on previous 
bids 
medium 
10 Public Procurement 3: 
Anti-Corruption Campaign 
2.03 
Records of acquisition, 
licensing for medical supplies 
providers 
- Self-identified watchdog group investigating corruption and 
under-provision in medical supplies 
high 
20 Medical Supplies 2: 
Purchases and Spending  
1.24 
Records of spending and 
purchasing at public clinics 
-Firms: market research; seeking info. for gov. bids or following 
up on previous bids 
-NGOs/citizen groups: eval. procurement to detect corruption 
 
medium 
7 Medical Supplies 3: 
Inventories 
0.56 
Purchases and inventories of 
medical supplies at public 
clinics 
-Firms: market research 
low/medium 
Table 1: Topics of information requests with descriptive information and accountability potential. Topics ordered by size. 
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Figure 3: Trends over time for each topic’s monthly proportion of all requests. Each topic is shown in black, with remaining topics in grey.
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In evaluating each topic’s potential for accountability, we infer the potential requesters 
and their likely uses. As mentioned above, we understand public accountability-relevant 
information as that which is useful in evaluating government performance, decisionmaking, or 
detecting malfeasance. Thus, topics that we score as high are useful for such ends as monitoring 
provision of goods or services, investigating potential wrongdoing, or questioning official 
versions of events. Topics scored as less relevant include information that serves solely private 
purposes such as applying for government benefits, winning a government contract, or checking 
on a regulatory evaluation. While some topics include a mix of requests that appear to be 
accountability-generating and private, requests of each type nonetheless tend to cluster in 
different topics as illustrated in the in-depth discussions below. Topics coded as “high” were 
those for which the majority of reviewed requests (roughly 90 percent or higher) were clearly 
linked to accountability-seeking action cycles, while for topics in the “low” category this was 
much smaller (roughly ten percent or lower).  
In Table 2, we present both the number of topics and the proportion of all requests falling 
into each of our categories of accountability-seeking potential. Notably, 52.6 percent of all 
requests pertain to topics with “Medium/High” or “High” potential for accountability, while 66.5 
percent pertain to topics in the three highest categories. 
 
Potential for Accountability Number of Topics Percent of all Requests 
Low 3 19.9 
Low/Medium 3 13.6 
Medium 4 13.9 
Medium/High 4 23.2 
High 6 29.4 
Table 2. The number of topics, and associated percentage of requests, coded with each category 
of accountability-seeking potential.  
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  For the six topics coded as having high potential for accountability, the vast majority of 
requests reviewed were easily associated to accountability-seeking processes. These include 
some large topics, such as those on Environment and Land and Budgets and Spending (reviewed 
in detail below), as well as some smaller topics. For instance, Topic 10 consisted almost entirely 
of requests about medical procurement from a single anti-corruption campaign that frequently 
identified itself in requests.  
We coded three topics as having low potential for accountability. It is difficult to envision 
how the information requested in these categories would be deployed for public purposes. 
Requests in Topics 6 (Individual Needs) and 4 (Government Employees: Salaries and Benefits) 
were closely connected to specific concerns of requesters themselves, in the former case because 
they were seeking guidance for accessing government benefits or resolving a particular 
bureaucratic process, and in the latter case because they were likely current, former, or 
prospective employees seeking information about pay scales, pensions, and benefits. Requests in 
Topic 13 (Medical Statistics) sought aggregate information about the incidence of diseases and 
treatment. While this information may be useful to academics or medical professionals, it does 
not provide the type of detailed information needed in evaluating policy performance or 
detecting corruption.  
The eleven topics in middle categories were combinations of requests that appeared to be 
accountability-relevant with others of more likely private purpose. For instance, Topic 18, scored 
as having medium potential for accountability, has to do with public procurement, and many 
requests relate to the contracting of services for government agencies, such as internet service, 
consulting, or insurance. Civil society actors or journalists can make such requests to detect 
cronyism or kickbacks in the granting of these contracts. However, it is equally plausible that 
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such requests are made by competing firms aiming to gain information for use in their own 
future bids.  
What is clear from these topics, and their distributions, is that citizen demand for 
information comprises a wide diversity of uses. Citizens seek both accountability-relevant 
information and information for private uses. Even a single government agency is likely to 
receive a wide variety of information requests, potentially including beneficiaries seeking access 
to services or procedures, firms seeking contracts, academics seeking aggregate statistics, civic 
groups seeking information for activism, and journalists investigating spending, decision-
making, or potential corruption. 
We do not intend to denigrate private uses. The ability to seek information for private 
goals can help equalize otherwise-biased access to services. Offering a platform for citizen-state 
interaction can demonstrate government responsiveness regardless of the information being 
requested. Further, to the extent that the ATI system provides information about government 
regulatory procedures and contracts, it should favor healthy market competition. Nonetheless, 
such uses are inconsistent with those that motivated the ATI system’s founding and may be 
better served through a proactive open-data system rather than a time-intensive request system.  
The following sections describe several selected topics in greater detail. We devote 
particular attention to the four largest topics, as well as to the topic on Military, Police, and 
Crime – an issue of particular public salience. Full descriptions of all twenty topics, along with 
example requests and additional validity checks, appear in the Online Appendix.  
 
Topic 3: Environment and Land 
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The largest topic, accounting for 8.6% of all requests, primarily concerns environmental issues, 
impact reports, construction, land tenure, and land use. This is reflected both in the topwords, 
and in the frequency of requests directed to ministries dealing with related matters. Many 
individual requests ask for environmental impact reports for specific projects, planning 
documents, property titles, boundaries of protected areas, or information on environmental 
damage. Likely requesters include both ordinary citizens and activists concerned about the 
environmental impact of development projects or disputes over land ownership. Indeed, officials 
at SEMARNAT, the environmental ministry, suggested that the most frequent type of 
information request they receive concerns local environmental conflict, frequently over the use 
and designation of protected land.14 Journalists may also seek such information, particularly 
given suspicion of corruption in projects violating proper permitting and environmental impact 
procedures. 
As such, this topic has a high potential for accountability-seeking uses. Information may 
be deployed to make claims on the state regarding such public issues as environmental 
enforcement and infrastructure and such private claims as processing of land titles and permits. 
However, some requests may also come from developers or construction companies themselves, 
seeking information for commercial purposes.   
One example of this type of information playing a role in public accountability comes 
from the case of a football stadium approved for construction in an ecological reserve on the 
outskirts of Monterrey, a large northern city. In 2012, two information requests to SEMARNAT, 
Mexico’s environmental ministry, sought documents related to permitting and the environmental 
																																																								
14 Interview, Mexico City, March 2017. Interviews conducted under Arizona State University IRB 
approval 00005773. 
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impact report for the stadium.15 SEMARNAT ultimately denied the requests on the grounds that 
it was not their responsibility to provide the information, referring the requesters to municipal 
and state governments. However, upon appeal, the information commission found in favor of the 
requesters, arguing that SEMARNAT was obliged to produce documents in cases where land use 
rules were being altered for environmentally protected areas. Local environmental activists then 
used the information from the requested documents during a series of protests and media 
campaigns that lasted over two years, claiming that the company building the stadium had not 
followed proper procedures to change the land use category of the forest land to permit building 
a stadium. Although the stadium was ultimately completed, the movement managed to bring 
international scrutiny on the project and legal action against Heineken, an international partner of 
the Mexican corporation that owns the Monterrey-based soccer team and stadium. 
 
Topic 6: Individual Needs 
Requests in the second largest topic, accounting for 8.5% of all requests, are notable for their 
orientation towards individual needs, and most appear to be submitted by laypersons rather than 
elite actors. This is reflected in the topwords, which do not share a substantive theme but rather 
capture verbs such as “to do,” “to know,” and “would like,” and other words frequent to simple 
																																																								
15 On the information request and IFAI’s upholding of the appeal for information to be released see: 
<http://www.noticiasmvs.com/#!/noticias/debera-semarnat-proporcionar-expedientes-de-la-
manifestacion-de-impacto-ambiental-ifai-153>. On the activism against the stadium, see: 
<http://horizontal.mx/el-estadio-bbva-bancomer-monumento-al-despojo-ambiental/> and 
<http://www.proceso.com.mx/270051/viola-acuerdos-ambientales-el-proyecto-de-nuevo-estadio-de-
monterrey-firma-holandesa>. 
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requests focused on the needs of the individual requester. Many requests in this topic ask how to 
access government services such as social benefits, pensions, education, or subsidized loans; or 
how to complete official procedures or fulfill requirements. Some of these requests ask where to 
go or inquire to fulfill these needs, while others ask what specific requirements, forms, or 
information is necessary. In interviews, officials from several different government ministries 
noted the frequency of requests with these characteristics. 
This topic has very low potential for accountability-seeking purposes, as requests 
typically seek information useful for making private decisions or problem-solving, rather than 
information that may relate to state performance or malfeasance. This topic’s share of all 
requests has also trended downward over time, possibly reflecting the increased availability of 
such information online. 
A representative example is an information request submitted on January 17, 2007, in 
which the requester asked for information about how to apply for a government subsidized 
small-business loan for their bakery. Such requests do not fit into any typical link between 
information and accountability. The information requested will not provide evidence of 
government performance and is not plausibly useful to make politicians answerable to citizens.  
 
Topic 17: Budgets and Spending  
The third-largest topic, accounting for 8% of all requests, comprises requests concerning budgets 
and spending by government agencies. Most requests in this topic are clearly linked to 
accountability-generating action cycles. This is reflected in the topwords, and in the frequency of 
requests directed to the office of the President and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
Most individual requests in this topic ask for budget allocations or amounts of spending. Some 
	29	
ask for such information in aggregate terms (such as the full budget breakdown for a particular 
agency), while others are very specific (such as the amount spent for a particular use). Likely 
requesters include ordinary citizens, civil society groups, journalists, or even politicians or 
officials themselves – effectively anybody interested in budget or spending information but 
without alternative means to access it.  
This topic clearly has a high potential for accountability-seeking uses, including attempts 
to identify improper or irregular spending, compare or criticize budget priorities, or identify 
corruption. In interviews, officials from several government ministries noted the frequency of 
receiving requests for information on spending, and suggested that such requests were often seen 
as the most likely to be politically sensitive or to generate negative media attention. 
A frequent focus of these requests is agency spending on promotional campaigns, a 
common occurrence in Mexico where elected politicians and ministry heads buy advertising to 
promote government programs, public health campaigns, or other purposes. Such spending is 
often alleged of being misused to serve the electoral goals of politicians or to steer funds to 
allies. Several such requests were submitted by Fundar, a Mexico City-based NGO, as part of an 
oversight campaign seeking datasets and lists of ad buys and contracts between the government 
agencies and media firms themselves.16 Using these data, the campaign revealed that in the first 
year of Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency, the federal government exceeded by close to 50% the 
budget that had been approved by congress for official publicity, spending 7.6 billion pesos 
																																																								
16 In addition to monitoring for overspending on publicity, these contracts permit detection into whether 
media companies offer special treatment to the ruling administration by undercharging.  
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(about US $600 million).17 Such findings helped pressure INAI to launch a new website in 2016, 
providing focused information on government advertising by local, state, and federal entities.18 
 
Topic 8: Commercial Information 
The fourth largest topic – accounting for 7.9% of requests – primarily concerns 
information of commercial relevance, such as trademarks, business licenses and registrations, 
product safety approvals, and administrative proceedings or court cases involving specific 
businesses or products. Most requests in this topic seek specific documents or statistics regarding 
commercial processes such as trademarks, product approvals, and business registrations. The 
vast majority of these betray a high level of expertise into government and business statutes and 
procedures, while requesting highly specific information that is unlikely to be of interest in 
accountability-generating action cycles. The two agencies that comprise the largest proportions 
of requests in this topic are COFEPRIS, which manages health and safety regulations for food 
and pharmaceutical products, and the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property, which manages 
patents and trademarks. This topic’s share of all requests has generally trended upwards over 
time, potentially reflecting the extent to which commercial requesters are increasingly aware of 
information requests as a useful tool. 
The most likely requesters in this topic are commercial entities seeking information on 
their own regulatory processes, or on those of their competitors or potential business partners. 
For instance, many requests to COFEPRIS referenced a case number and asked for specific dates 
																																																								
17 See <http://www.fundar.org.mx/mexico/pdf/LibertadDigitalOk.pdf> (p. 61) 
18 <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2016/11/23/ponen-lupa-gasto-del-gobierno-
en-publicidad> 
	31	
and documents pertaining to product evaluations. Such usage parallels the situation in the United 
States and United Kingdom (Worthy 2013, Kwoka 2016), where commercial actors are among 
the most frequent ATI users, often filing requests to track their own regulatory approvals and 
those of their competitors. However, some requests in this topic may be accountability-seeking, 
particularly in cases of investigations into unsafe products or potential corruption in regulatory 
processes.  
 
Topic 16: Military, Police, and Crime   
This topic relates to the military and the criminal justice system. While the topwords by highest 
probability primarily pertain to classes of information – such as annual statistics and particular 
cases – the most frequent and exclusive words reflect an emphasis on police, the military, 
criminals, and drug trafficking. The agencies most frequently receiving requests in this topic are 
the Attorney General’s Office, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Public Security, and the 
Federal Police.  
This topic is the sixth largest, accounting for 6.8% of all requests. Its share of all requests 
remained relatively stable over time until roughly 2010, when it began to trend upwards (albeit 
with a dip in 2013), perhaps as a result of intensification of drug war-related violence.   
Individual requests in this topic most often asked for aggregate statistics on crime, 
prosecutions, and violence, but several requests also related to security policies. Requests for 
statistics asked about the number of victims and number of prosecutions for specific crimes. 
Requests about security policies queried such topics as state treatment of human rights 
complaints or troop deployment in confrontations with organized crime. For instance, one 
request asked about the number of human rights victims registered by a human rights NGO that 
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had been recognized as victims by the newly formed Executive Commission for Attention to 
Victims. This commission was created in 2013 at the pressure of social groups representing 
victims of human rights abuses related to Mexico’s drug war and their families.19  
Likely requesters of information about the military and security are journalists reporting 
on crime and the drug war, as well as NGOs that work with victims or local security. This topic 
has a high potential for accountability as such groups may use the information in campaigns to 
pressure the state to enhance security, redress victims, or to follow criminal law procedures. 
Information may be particularly relevant to electoral campaigns, as success and failings in the 
area of security are of high political salience, particularly in the context of scandals such as the 
2014 disappearance of 43 students in the rural municipality of Ayotzinapa, which has been the 
focus of many information requests.20 
 
Linkage of Information Demand to Issues of Public Salience 
Our examination of the topics of citizen demand for information suggest a wide diversity of uses, 
including both accountability-seeking and private purposes. To further evaluate the potential role 
of information in public accountability, we also assess the extent to which information demand 
exhibits linkage between changing real-world conditions and trends in information demand. 
Where the ATI system is used for accountability-seeking purposes, we would expect to find 
																																																								
19 See: <http://expansion.mx/nacional/2012/04/25/la-ley-general-de-victimas-un-logro-mas-para-el-
movimiento-por-la-paz> 
20 For example, <http://www.proceso.com.mx/418730/el-expediente-ayotzinapa-una-burda-
manipulacion> and <http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2016/07/15/estudio-fuego-gasto-seguridad-
nacional>. 
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strong linkage between information demand and changes over time and across regions in the 
issues that are likely to generate media attention, activism, and be most salient for citizen 
evaluation of government performance. Such linkage could take a variety of forms: Citizens and 
journalists may react directly to events and issues by seeking relevant information. Alternately, 
citizens and civic groups may react to media reports themselves by seeking additional 
information or mobilizing around new demands. Indeed, one government official noted a saying 
(translated) that “today’s headline is tomorrow’s information request.”21  
We offer evidence of such linkage between variation in topics over space and time, and 
real-world issues of public interest such as the environment, oil production, and criminal 
violence. If citizens and organizations employ information requests in ways that engage with 
issues of public interest, and respond to new developments, then we should see the distribution 
of topics vary over space and time in correspondence with key issues.  
Figure 4 maps the intensity of requests by state for four different topics. The Online 
Appendix contains maps for all twenty topics. These maps do not simply display the raw number 
of requests, as on that measure the Federal District predominates for nearly every topic. Rather, 
we calculate, for each topic and state, the share of all requests in a given state that is made up by 
a given topic. Thus, in the first panel of Figure 7, requests on Environment and Land make up a 
large proportion of requests filed from Baja California, even though a greater absolute number of 
requests on that topic are filed from the Federal District.  
The spatial variation in these topics is consistent with an information request environment 
linked to issues of regional public salience. For instance, the distribution of request intensity for 
Topic 3 reflects greater interest in states where environmentally protected coastal areas have 
																																																								
21 Interview, Mexico City, March 2017. 
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been threatened by seaside tourist development. The distribution of request intensity for Topic 12 
reflects that topic’s focus on oil and energy production, with high request intensity in states with 
oil and natural gas production. For Topic 16, the spatial distribution of request intensity 
highlights northern states that have been sites of substantial violence during the Drug War, as 
well as Chiapas where both border issues and long-simmering rural conflicts have received 
substantial attention. Finally, requests on Topic 19, which emphasizes procedural information 
and documents related to public procurement, are focused in the Federal District and nearby 
states, with much less intensity of interest in the rest of the country. The fact that some topics of 
information demand are focused around the capital, while others are focused in different parts of 
the country, as well as the extent to which that variation corresponds with key issues of interest, 
demonstrates the linkage of information demand with issues of public salience.  
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Figure 4: Request intensity by state for four different topics. States are shaded by the share of 
the specified topic out of all requests in that state. The scale is relative – the four states with the 
highest intensity for each topic are shaded the darkest color. 
 
 
We also demonstrate linkage through the variation of information demand over time. We 
show that requests for information on Topic 16 (Military, Police, and Crime) are driven in part 
by actual levels of violence. We aggregate monthly counts of requests, and regress the logged 
number of requests associated with Topic 16 on the logged number of homicides across the 
country in the previous month, using data from INEGI. While not all of these homicides will be 
related to violent crime and drug-trafficking organizations of public interest, most of the 
Topic 3: Environment and Land
Share of Requests in Each State
Topic 12: Energy and Utilities
Share of Requests in Each State
Topic 16: Military, Police, and Crime
Share of Requests in Each State
Topic 19: Public Procurement 2: Procedures and Documents
Share of Requests in Each State
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systematic variation from month to month in aggregate homicide counts are likely to be driven 
by such developments. If citizens use information requests in a manner that is linked to shifts in 
issues of public interest, then we should see more homicides associated with more requests on 
the relevant topic of information.  
Table 3 presents the results of five alternate models of the effects of monthly homicides 
on logged monthly information requests. Model 1 includes only the logged number of homicides 
in the previous month. Model 2 adds a lagged dependent variable, to account for serial 
dependence in the monthly number of requests related to the military, police, and crime. Model 3 
adds month fixed effects, to account for seasonal trends (such as the tendency for fewer requests 
in December). All three of these models show a positive and statistically significant effect of 
homicides on requests for relevant information.  
One concern might be that these results are simply driven by the overall differences 
between the periods before and after President Calderón escalated the “drug war” at the outset of 
his term in office. Model 4 thus demonstrates that the results still obtain, even employing only 
data from 2007 onwards. We also conduct a “placebo” test, using a dependent variable based on 
all requests for information, rather than Topic 16 only. Indeed, the effect of homicides on all 
requests for information is much smaller and only marginally significant, although still positive. 
This suggests that while the effect of homicides is primarily to increase the demand for 
information on the military, police, and crime, some other topics of information may also see 
increased demand as well. More broadly, these results suggest that citizen demand for 
government information is linked to real-world events of public interest, at least in the case of 
public violence.  
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Log Homicides"#$ 0.734*** 
(0.070) 
0.283*** 
(0.077) 
0.176*** 
(0.063) 
0.228*** 
(0.060) 
0.087* 
(0.044) 
Log Topic 16 Requests"#$  0.613*** 
(0.072) 
0.764*** 
(0.062) 
0.152 
(0.115) 
 
Log All Requests"#$     0.876*** 
(0.047) 
Dependent Variable Topic 16 Topic 16 Topic 16 Topic 16 All 
Requests 
Time Period Full Full Full 2007+ Full 
Month Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R& 0.464 0.660 0.806 0.456 0.890 
Number of Observations 127 127 127 85 127 
***' < 0.01, **' < 0.05, *' < 0.10  Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 3: Linear regression models of logged monthly requests filed in Topic 16: Military, Police, 
and Crime. Models 3-5 include month fixed effects, Model 4 omits the pre-2007 period from the 
sample, and Model 5 uses an alternative dependent variable of the logged number of all requests 
regardless of topic. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Recent scholarship has made important strides in empirically testing the conditions under which 
information about government performance translates into political accountability. Important 
findings regarding the types of information most conducive to accountability, and the types of 
users and environments most conducive to deploying this information effectively, promise to 
inform the future design of ATI institutions. Until now, however, we lacked a systematic 
analysis of the types of information that the public requests from governments when presented 
with an effective information-request system. 
In this paper, we analyze the totality of information requests submitted to federal 
government agencies in Mexico from 2003 through 2015; over 1 million requests in all. As a 
means of sorting these into meaningful categories we use unsupervised topic models, a method 
designed to allow latent categories of information to emerge from bodies of text. Qualitative 
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coding of the resulting twenty topics designates fourteen topics as medium or higher in their 
relevance to public accountability, on matters such as budgets and spending, public procurement, 
criminal violence, and environmental conflict. These fourteen topics comprise 66.5% of all 
requests ever filed. Although not every individual request within these topics is necessarily 
actively linked to accountability-generating processes -- just as not every request in the other 
topics is necessarily removed from such processes -- these results nonetheless make clear the 
strong preponderance of accountability-seeking potential across the twenty topics we identify. 
On the other hand, we also find substantial evidence of information requests for private uses, 
both for ordinary citizens seeking access to benefits and assistance with procedures and 
commercial users seeking information on government contracting and regulation.  
We further assess the connection between citizen demand for information and issues of 
public relevance as they vary over both regions and time. We find evidence of such linkage, 
given suggestive geographic variation in topics pertaining to environmental issues, oil 
production, and public violence, as well as time-series models of request volume in relation to 
violence trends nationwide. The results suggest that a higher number of homicides is associated 
with more requests categorized in the topic on Military, Police, and Crime.  More generally, 
these identified associations also suggest that future analyses of Mexico’s ATI request texts may 
additionally benefit from more recent extensions to the LDA model that allow for the inclusion 
of document-level covariates as predictors of topical prevalence (e.g., Roberts et al. 2014) 
Our evidence on the topics of information demand, and their linkage with topics of public 
importance over space and time, are consistent with a public accountability model of information 
demand. However, we cannot fully dismiss the relevance of private uses. We emphasize the 
diversity of information demand, and the complex layering of both types of uses, even on the 
	39	
same platform and from the same government agencies. Simply put, access-to-information 
systems are useful for a wide variety of objectives, and we demonstrate that the greater part of 
these are relevant to holding politicians accountable for efficient and honest governance. 
Mexico may well represent a most-likely case to find citizen demand for accountability-
relevant information. Among transitional democracies, Mexico was a leader in adopting a user-
friendly information request system. Furthermore, as a society characterized by high levels of 
corruption and patronage, but also with a high density of civil society and interest organizations, 
there is no shortage of demand for information about what government does. Future studies may 
replicate our approach both in more mature democracies – which may more proactively provide 
information about government activities – and weaker democracies, where lack of state capacity 
or social capital may inhibit citizen demand for information.  
In countries with relatively poor responsiveness such as Albania (Dokeniya 2013), 
Argentina (Michener 2015), or South Africa (Berliner 2017), citizens may find information 
requests a less worthwhile mechanism; whereas governments that more proactively release data 
about government performance may to some extent obviate the need for citizens to use these 
institutions for routine processes of political accountability (Holsen and Pasquier 2012). Yet on 
the other hand, the reverse may obtain as well: Proactively available information may enable 
more effective use of ATI requests, while limited compliance can even create new openings for 
mobilization (Distelhorst 2017).   
Put together, our results suggest that citizens do, in fact, request information that is 
relevant to public accountability, when provided with the opportunity to do so. We thus offer a 
resounding affirmative response to the question “If you build it, will they come?” This suggests 
that, given a reasonably well-functioning ATI regime with low barriers to use, demand for 
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information is not the key obstacle to successful information-based accountability. Nonetheless, 
the clear prevalence of organizations and journalists among the likely potential users of 
accountability-relevant requests also highlights the continuing importance of broader ecosystems 
of information intermediaries (Fung 2013) and interlocutors (Fox 2015).  
However, we also highlight that these accountability-seeking uses exist alongside a 
substantial focus on information for private uses as well. Thus an important topic for future 
research is to explore whether accountability-seeking and private demands for government 
information tend to complement each other, or crowd each other out, in terms of the ability and 
willingness of officials to respond in positive ways.   
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